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A QUIET WAR: THE JUDICIARY’S STEADY
AND UNSPOKEN EFFORT TO LIMIT FELONYMURDER
Maggie Davis*

INTRODUCTION
On a Wednesday afternoon a sixteen-year-old boy is hanging
out after school with four of his friends.1 He is your average
sixteen-year-old; he has a girlfriend who works at Wendy’s, and
his current worry is about passing his driving test. He smokes
some weed from time to time with his friends, but he has a clean
criminal record. After complaining about being broke and
deciding they have nothing better to do, the five friends elect to
break into a seemingly vacant home in order to steal some items
for resale. He is already thinking about what he will buy with the
*

J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2021. Chair of the Board
of Advocates, 2020-2021. This author thanks Dean Brian Gallini, Willamette University
College of Law, for his constant guidance, needed edits, and heartfelt encouragement
throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank the hardworking team
members of the Arkansas Law Review, whether cite checking a clean edit or conducting a
super cite, your work is noticed, appreciated, and much needed. The author thanks her father
for always encouraging her to go after her dreams, especially the dreams that pursued a career
in law, and modeling how an amazing attorney balances life and work. The author thanks
her brother for setting the bar high and who always believed she could achieve this. She
thanks her mother for being the rock of the family and for her steadfast advice, support and
love. Finally, the author thanks her husband for always believing in her and for his selfless
love during life and law school.
1. These facts are adapted from Blake Layman’s felony-murder conviction in 2013.
See Ed Pilkington, Felony Murder: Why a Teenager Who Didn’t Kill Anyone Faces 55 Years
in Jail, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2015), [https://perma.cc/44WY-BDAM]. See also Layman v.
State, 17 N.E.3d 957, 960-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Blake Layman is one of many defendants
convicted of felony-murder who did not murder the victim. See e.g., Wilson v. State, 68
S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (Ark. 1934) (holding defendant liable for victim’s death when used as
shield and shot by police); People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1984) (holding
defendant liable for co-felon’s death after robbery of Church’s Fried Chicken and following
police shoot-out); State v. Kress, 253 A.2d 481, 483, 485, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1969) (holding defendant liable for bystander’s death caused by police during bank robbery);
People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993) (defendant held liable for undercover
officer’s death caused by another officer during attempted robbery).
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extra cash while knocking on the home’s door to double-check
that it is empty. He thinks he does not receive a reply, making the
unarmed break-in easy. But within minutes, everything changes.
The boys realize they are not alone, as evident by the
homeowner’s gun shots firing at the panicked teens. The kid has
never even held a gun but is now shot in the leg. The sixteenyear-old’s vision blurs from the pain, but not in time to miss his
friend collapse dead beside him. Only four boys remain living
when the police arrest them each for murder. Although none of
the teenagers touched a weapon during the robbery, the surviving
boys are each convicted of felony-murder in connection with the
death of the fifth robber.
A young man, X, puts on his Bulls jacket before stepping out
into a damp Chicago evening.2 X meets up with a friend because
the plan is to rob three others who have given them trouble. His
job was to force one of the three down an alley with a gun, for
added effect. All was going according to plan until something
unexpected happened. The victim seized the gun and, now joined
by his friends in the alley, X is outnumbered and gun-less as the
trio beat him in the dark. X escapes and runs to an open street
corner. During his flight, he hears gunshots and a woman scream.
Still running, he turns his jacket inside out, hoping to blend in.
The disguise does not prevent his police capture. And the fact
that he did not kill the woman who died during his escape does
not prevent his charge and conviction for her murder.
An abusive father takes his family on a camping trip a couple
of hours away.3 As a punishment, the father purposely impels his
son’s anal cavity with a stick before finishing the day’s camping
activities. The child’s health quickly deteriorates on the drive
home. Doctors pronounce the six-year-old dead later that
evening. The father was charged with felony-murder.4

2. These descriptions were created from the record in Antonio Lowery’s prosecution
in 1997. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ill. 1997).
3. These facts are minimally adapted from Mauricio Torres’ trial in 2019. See Torres
v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 15, 571 S.W.3d 456, 466-67 (Womack, J., dissenting).
4. As of this article’s completion in March 2020, Mauricio Torres had been convicted
for murder of his son twice. Tracy Neal, Judge Declares Mistrial in Arkansas Murder Case
After Stepson Lunges at Defendant, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Mar. 6, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/VHL2-439J] [hereinafter Neal, Mistrial]. The first conviction was
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These are the imbalanced stories that produce media
headlines like “Charged With Murder Without Killing Anyone,”5
“Controversial Law Charges People with Murder for Death at
Others’ Hand,”6 and “In the US, You Don’t Have to Kill to Be a
Murderer.”7 The inconsistent, unreliable, and often absurd
felony-murder convictions have flooded this nation’s adversarial
process since the first felony-murder statute. To be sure, reform
efforts exist.8 Legislators have, for instance, rewritten statutes in
an effort to identify an optimal amendment.9 As evident by the
continued ambiguity in felony-murder convictions, those largely
piecemeal efforts to clean-up a dated and widely criticized
doctrine have failed.
This Article makes two arguments. First, it asserts that a
recent Arkansas decision in Torres v. State10 signals a subtle but
important shift in judicial efforts to reform application of the
felony-murder doctrine. Second, it challenges state courts to
build on Torres and affirmatively impose a uniform judicial
limitation on felony-murder statutes—wholly apart and
notwithstanding any separate legislative reform efforts.
Part I examines the debated theories of how the felonymurder rule arrived in America and highlights the historic pattern
of the jurisdictions choosing to limit the felony-murder doctrine.
Part II assesses the fifty states’ different applications of the
legislature’s textual limitations and further judiciary-imposed
restrictions of the felony-murder doctrine.
Part III explores how Arkansas, in particular, has applied its
felony-murder statute in comparison to other states with similar
felony-murder rules. It then focuses on how Torres v. State
narrowly construed application of the felony murder doctrine.
overturned and remanded for retrial, and the second conviction was declared a mistrial during
the sentencing phase. Id.
5. Christie Thompson, Charged with Murder Without Killing Anyone, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2015), [https://perma.cc/BR6R-KTCA].
6. Duaa Eldeib, Controversial Law Charges People with Murder for Death at Others’
Hand, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2016), [https://perma.cc/LR2L-GL5X].
7. Jessica Lussenhop, In the US, You Don’t Have to Kill to Be a Murderer, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 9, 2018), [https://perma.cc/JS99-Y2WU].
8. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
9. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
10. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, 571 S.W.3d 456.
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Next, Part III explains the correct analysis of jurisdictional
statutes in relation to particular felonies and how that analysis
changes with felony-murder. Part III then argues that Arkansas’
treatment of the predicate felony in Torres was an incorrect and
misguided attempt to limit the scope of the felony-murder
doctrine. That restrictive approach, however, provides another
illustration of ongoing judicial attempts to limit the scope of
felony-murder. When considered historically, the judiciary’s
limiting efforts are, to put it charitably, disingenuous. In an effort
to clarify the scope and reach of the felony-murder rule, some
meaningful uniform approach is critically necessary. From that
analysis, Part III concludes by challenging states to continue to
judicially amend the felony-murder doctrine and proposes a
uniform judicial limitation that strictly interprets felony-murder
statutes when legislators continue to be silent in abolishing the
doctrine.

I. FELONY-MURDER ARRIVAL AND
ALTERATION: AN EARLY APPROACH
Common law felony-murder is a controversial doctrine and
has been since its initial adoption, as seen through its
commentator’s critiques and diverse application across the
states.11 Common law felony-murder provides that if a homicide
occurs during a felony or attempted commission of a felony, that
homicide is murder.12 Malice aforethought is the mens rea
element of common law murder.13 But malice, in the felonymurder context, is implied by the mens rea of the predicate
felony.14 Thus, proof of the underlying felony provides the

11. Jennifer DeCook Hatchett, Kansas Felony Murder: Agency or Proximate Cause?,
48 U. KAN. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2000); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The FelonyMurder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446
(1985); see generally Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV.
403, 465-75 (2011) [hereinafter Binder, Making the Best].
12. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 522 (5th ed. 2009);
Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020).
13. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM.
JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020).
14. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1047; 40 AM.
JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020).
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malice requirement for murder.15 That approach—imputing
malice—enables the state to charge murder from a range of
factual behavior, anywhere from a reckless disregard for the risk
of human life to an entirely accidental death.16 Application of the
felony-murder doctrine varies across jurisdictions.17 Depending
on a specific statute’s wording, it can reach the conduct of any
felon, agent of the felon, or any person that proximately caused
any death during the unlawful activity.18
Scholarly articles, courts, and legislative commentaries have
heavily criticized the felony-murder doctrine.19 The rule has
allies in those who believe the doctrine deters criminals from
committing felonies that could produce a death by encouraging
them to be more careful during felonies that could potentially
cause a death.20 Supporters rationalize the rule on a retribution
basis, in that a crime which involves a death “should be punished
more severely than the same crime that does not [result] in
death[.]”21 The majority of commentators attack the expansive
rule because of its uneven application to the defendant’s actual
conduct committed and the automatic result with which he is
charged.22 Moreover, they argue that a criminal would have to
know about the felony-murder rule and its wide-casting
15. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020).
16. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 522; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60 (2020);
Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to Understand
Today’s Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006).
17. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
18. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.5(d), at 615-20 (3d
ed. 2018). Causation is a required element of felony-murder cases, as in other homicide case.
Id. at 615. It is possible, in the context of felony murder, the death could be either a response
to the defendants conduct or a mere coincidence, only present to be acted upon by the
defendant’s acts. Id. at 616. Courts apply the foreseeability test to establish the defendant’s
unlawful act as the proximate cause. Id. at 615-16.
19. See Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3. The rule has been “described as ‘astonishing’
and ‘monstrous,’ an unsupportable ‘legal fiction,’ ‘an unsightly wart on the skin of the
criminal law,’ and as an ‘anachronistic remnant’ that has ‘no logical or practical basis for
existence in modern law.’” Roth & Sundby, supra note 11, at 446. See also DRESSLER,
supra note 12, at 521; LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 644-45.
20. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 133 (Cal. 1965); Birdsong, supra note
16, at 2-3; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1048; 40 AM. JUR. 2D Felony-murder § 60, (2020).
21. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 523; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1048; see Roth &
Sundby, supra note 11, at 457-60.
22. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1049; Roth & Sundby,
supra note 11, at 446.
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application before commencing the crime for either deterrence or
retributive paralogical norms to appropriately apply.23
Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder doctrine
is typically taught to every first-year law student in his or her
criminal law course.24 It remains taught because the doctrine is
alive and well today.25 Indeed, some form of a felony-murder
statute can be found in almost every jurisdiction in the United
States.26 Although prevalent, current felony-murder statutes look
vastly different from their historical common law predecessors.27
This highlights an important question: why has the doctrine
changed?
The story begins with a debate over whether the American
felony-murder doctrine was adopted from the English common
law.28 Rather than extensive judicial decisions interpreting the
use of the felony-murder rule, the English common law seems to
only note scholarly and clerical commentaries introducing the
concept.29 Rooted in Christian ethics, the first idea may have
derived from the overarching view that unintended harms could
be punished if they were the result of unlawful acts.30
In 1235, scholars paused for the first time to think about the
potential implications of the expansive felony-murder doctrine
and attempted to limit its applicability.31 Commentator Henry de
Bracton assessed the culpability of a person when an
unintentional killing resulted from a lawful or unlawful act and
concluded that accidental killings were not considered homicides
because they lacked the intention to injure.32 In contrast, in 1619,
23. Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1049.
24. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 521-22; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 13; see
generally LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 604.
25. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 521-22; Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1050;
Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; see generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
26. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 3; see generally infra Part II and accompanying
discussion.
27. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 605-07; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
28. See generally Birdsong, supra note 16, at 4-12.
29. Id. at 4-5; Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 59, 73 (2004) [hereinafter Binder, Origins].
30. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 5; Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 73.
31. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 74-75; Brian R. Gallini, Equal Sentences for
Unequal Participation: Should the Eighth Amendment Allow All Juvenile Murder
Accomplices to Receive Life Without Parole?, 87 OR. L. REV. 29, 80 n.281 (2008).
32. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 74-75; Gallini, supra note 31, at 80 & n.281.
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commentator Michael Dalton made a general proposition that it
was conceivable that an accidental killing in the course of an
unlawful act could in fact be felonious.33 Still later in 1628,
Edward Coke asserted that a person should be charged for
unintentional deaths even if they resulted from intentional
unlawful acts.34
During the end of the seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale
of Kent, Lord Chief Justice in England, further refined Coke’s
view of murder.35 Lord Hale focused his interpretation on the
unlawful act in order to establish a degree of homicide by
requiring a mental state of “intent to harm,” somewhat analogous
with the particular enumerated felonies found in modern felonymurder statutes.36 Although the concept of felony-murder was
intertwined in scholarly discussions, skeptics of American
felony-murder being adopted from English common law rely on
the great lack of English judicial decisions actually using the
doctrine.37
Early American colonies were further influenced to narrow
the doctrine by Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England, in which he proposed a rule focusing on the
dangerousness of the predicate crime rather than its categorical
quality as a “felony.”38 Blackstone’s theory stated that the initial
intent to commit one felony sufficed for the unintended felonious
result, then applied an enhanced proportion of punishment
applicable when an involuntary killing happened as the
consequence of an unlawful act.39 American jurisdictions’ varied
and dispersed adoption of felony-murder rules indicates the
states’ unwillingness to adopt the doctrine in its overly broad
common law form.40 Therefore, it is likely that colonial
Americans were simply familiar with the expansive English
common law felony-murder doctrine, introduced through English
legal commentators and Blackstone’s commentaries, then chose
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Birdsong, supra note 16, at 8; Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 81.
Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 81-82.
Birdsong, supra note 16, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 65.

580

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:3

to limit its application when adopting it into various American
jurisdictions.41
In 1794, Pennsylvania became the first of many jurisdictions
to take a shot at refining the doctrine.42 Pennsylvania chose to
affirmatively narrow felony-murder by introducing America’s
first statute that limited its application to specific felonies.43 The
murder grading statute aggravated murder liability based on
participation in the specific listed felonies.44 The statute stated:
“[A]ll murder . . . or which shall be committed in the perpetration
or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary,
shall be deemed murder in the first degree . . . .”45 The statute
implied that any murder in the course of an enumerated felony did
not require the willful, deliberate, and premeditated mindset
element required elsewhere by the first-degree murder statute.46
Yet, it restricted the breadth of felony-murder by deciding that the
particular felonious acts listed (“arson, rape, robbery, or
burglary”) were the only legislatively selected inherently
dangerous felonies.47
Pennsylvania’s reform sparked a
nationwide overhaul of homicide statutes; thirty-one states
adopted a version of its grading scheme, twelve of which made
little to no textual changes.48

41. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 25-26.
42. See Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17.
43. The Pennsylvania statute states:
[A]ll murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by laying in
wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or
which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder in the first degree; and all
other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree.
Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1766, § 2, 1794 Pa. Laws 186, 187 (current version at 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 2502 (1978)); Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at
17.
44. Act of Apr. 22, 1794, ch. 1766, § 2, 1794 Pa. Laws 186, 187 (current version at 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502); Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16,
at 17.
45. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17.
Pennsylvania chose to statutorily limit application of felony-murder by providing that
commission of only certain felonies could expose the defendant to capital punishment.
Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119.
46. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 18.
47. Id. at 17-18.
48. Id.
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The nineteenth century was a time of trial and error for the
felony-murder doctrine through its widespread adoption and
drastic differences in scope.49 Jurisdictions tried defining felonymurder with variations of three different textual-limiting
approaches, predicating liability on: (1) express or implied malice
shown through the commission of any violent or dangerous
felony; (2) one of the several dangerous enumerated felonies, or
(3) any felony.50
In 1827, Illinois employed the first approach when the
legislature attempted to textually limit its felony murder statute.51
Illinois defined murder as an unlawful killing with express or
implied malice and was the first to statutorily address unintended
killings in the course of a felony.52 Illinois’s statute stated:
“involuntary killing . . . in the commission of an unlawful act
which in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a
human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious
intent, . . . shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder.”53 The
Illinois judiciary then sought to further limit its application by
applying the doctrine to only inherently dangerous felonies.54
Dissatisfied with current applications, New Jersey, only a
couple of years later in 1829, arguably broadened the scope of the
felony-murder doctrine.55 The New Jersey murder statute
included a killing “in committing, or attempting to commit
sodomy, rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, or any unlawful act
against the peace of this state, of which the probable consequence
may be bloodshed . . . .”56 Although New Jersey attempted to
narrow the Illinois approach by enumerating specific inherently
dangerous felonies, its catch-all “unlawful act” phrase created an

49. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 119.
50. Id. at 121, 161-62.
51. Id. at 120-21, 162.
52. Id. at 120-21; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 18-19.
53. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
54. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 162.
55. Id. at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
56. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121 (quoting Act of Feb. 17, 1829, § 66, 18281829 N.J. Acts 109, 128 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017));
Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
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all-encompassing list that likely did nothing to alter the doctrine’s
previous application.57
That same year, the New York legislature enacted its own
version of a felony-murder statute.58 It defined murder as any
killing “without any design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the commission of any felony.”59 However, the judiciary,
displeased with the text’s expansive nature, again chose to narrow
the application creating a “merge[r] limitation[,]” which required
the predicate felony to have a purpose independent of the
homicide.60 Thus, if the predicate that caused the death was
assaultive in nature, it merged with the death and disallowed an
additional felony-murder charge.61
Moving forward, jurisdictions borrowed from these three
approaches—inherently dangerous felony, enumerated felonies,
or any felony—to create their own felony-murder statutes with
the common goal of attempting to perfect a tailoring system for
the expansive doctrine.62 Further, when textual decisions by the
legislature frustrated criminal justice, the judiciary stepped in to
narrow the statutes’ application.63 Consequently, the various
versions of the felony-murder rule only further complicated and
diversified the doctrine’s application from state to state.64
The varied scope of the rule from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
displeased the bench, bar, and media alike.65 In response, the
American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the Model Penal Code
(MPC) in 1962 to clarify and simplify the United States’ criminal
common law.66 In the context of felony-murder, MPC § 210.2,
the MPC’s murder provision, states:
57. See Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
58. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 171-72.
59. Id. at 121 & n.312, 171-72; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
60. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 173 (internal quotations omitted); see People v.
Rector, 19 Wend. 569, 592-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
61. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 173.
62. See LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 607-10; see generally infra Part II and
accompanying discussion.
63. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
64. Binder, Origins, supra note 29, at 121 & n.313; Birdsong, supra note 16, at 19.
65. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 30; MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW:
MODEL PENAL CODE 8 (2002).
66. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE, at xi-xii (AM. L. INST.
1984); DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 30; DUBBER, supra note 65, at 8.

2020

A QUIET WAR

583

[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when . . . it is
committed recklessly . . .
[s]uch recklessness and
indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force,
arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.67

Although, at first glance, it does not seem the MPC
drastically clarified or altered the current interpretation of the
doctrine,68 the Explanatory Note for MPC § 210.2 makes plain
that the MPC purposively departed from the traditional felonymurder rule.69 The commentary indicates that the drafters
intended to abandon felony-murder as an independent basis of
liability.70 Instead, it listed specific felonies that established a
presumption of recklessness and indifference to the value of
human life.71 The drafters described the presumption as “a
concession to the facilitation of proof” that was persuasive rather
than the deciding liability factor.72 This marked the first time that
noted American law professors, judges, attorneys, and other
professionals in the legal profession were outspoken with their
disdain for the felony-murder rule by eliminating its existence in
the proposed code.73 Despite the MPC’s efforts, inconsistent
iterations of felony-murder persist at the state level to this day.74

67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1985).
68. See DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 548-49; DUBBER, supra note 65, at 5.
69. The explanatory note to Pt. II, Art. 210 provides as follows:
Section 210.2(1)(b) establishes a presumption that the requisite recklessness and indifference
to the value of human life exist when a homicide is committed during the course of certain
enumerated felonies. This presumption has the effect of abandoning the strict liability
aspects of the traditional felony-murder doctrine but at the same time recognizing the
probative significance of the concurrence of homicide and a violent felony.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note; DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 54849.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note.
72. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. at 30; Roth & Sundby, supra note 11, at 472.
73. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 explanatory note.
74. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
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II. CURRENT APPLICATION IN THE FIFTY
STATES
Two centuries after Pennsylvania’s first revision of the
felony-murder doctrine, the doctrine remains in disarray.75 Every
jurisdiction arguably applies a different combination of
applicable predicate felonies and interpretation of other judicial
and textual limitations.76 This Part explores statewide statutory
and judicial reform efforts organized on a range, beginning first
with the two states that have statutorily eliminated the felonymurder doctrine.77 It then focuses on the great minority of states
that chose not to include an enumerated list of predicate felonies
by exploring their textual limitations and judicial application of
the doctrine.78 It finishes by examining the vast majority of states
that enumerate specific felonies in the statutes’ text and other
limitations that either the legislators or judiciary chose to
impose.79
Despite nearly uniform dissatisfaction with the felonymurder rule, only two jurisdictions have statutorily abolished the
doctrine.80 Hawaii, by statute, “eliminated from [Hawaii’s] law
the felony-murder rule.”81 The statute’s commentary thoroughly
explained that the legislator’s choice to abolish was based off
felony-murder’s “history of . . . condemnation,”82 a judicial trend
limiting felony-murder rule’s scope, and a concern about the
doctrine’s underlying illogic.83 Hawaii discredited the doctrine’s
purpose—to deter—and highlighted that the felony-murder rule
produced “extremely questionable results” across jurisdictions.84
75. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
76. See generally infra Part II and accompanying discussion.
77. See generally infra p. 13 and accompanying discussion.
78. See generally infra pp. 13-15 and accompanying discussion.
79. See generally infra pp. 15-18 and accompanying discussion.
80. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (2016) (Felony-Murder Rule); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt. (West 1974); Birdsong, supra note 16, at 20 n.135;
Gallini, supra note 31, at 82.
81. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
82. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (2016) (Felony-Murder Rule); Criminal Law:
Felony-Murder Rule—Felon’s Responsibility for Death of Accomplice, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1496, 1496 (1965).
83. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
84. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701 cmt. (Felony-Murder Rule).
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Kentucky also “abandon[ed] the doctrine . . . as an
independent basis . . . of homicide.”85 Rather, deaths that occur
in the course of another felony must either (1) be intentional; or
(2) occur with wanton extreme indifference to human life.86 The
commentary explains the adaptation was a shift to model the MPC
in its homicide statute.87
Judicial reform efforts to the felony-murder rule are, unlike
statutory revisions, far more common.88 That has, however, only
served to create more confusion.89 Only Michigan90 and
Massachusetts91 have judicially abolished the felony-murder rule.
In direct opposition, South Carolina is the only state that solely
employs the common law felony-murder rule through judicial
decision.92
Forty-seven states have adopted felony-murder by statute;
however, each textual description and application of the rule
greatly differs from state-to-state.93 Consider first that only
85. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt. (West 1974).
86. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt. Otherwise, if the death
lacks extreme indifference, it is considered manslaughter.
87. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt.
88. See generally infra pp. 14, 16-19 and accompanying discussion.
89. See generally infra pp. 14, 16-19 and accompanying discussion.
90. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980). See also LAFAVE, supra
note 18, at 645. However, the textual predicate felonies are still applied in the listed statute.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321-22.
91. Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1191 (Mass. 2017) (deciding felonymurder will no longer be an independent theory of liability for murder outside its statutory
rule).
92. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(1) (2010). The South Carolina murder statute
reads: “[m]urder is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express of
implied.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2019) (internal quotations omitted). The judiciary
has chosen to adopt felony-murder yet has struggled with concretely defining malice in order
to apply the doctrine. See Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 446. In 2007, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that malice cannot be automatically presumed from
participation in a felony. Lowry v. State, 657 S.E.2d 760, 764 (S.C. 2008). Although the
court held that malice was a distinct element, it did not define malice in the context of felonymurder. See id. South Carolina’s Pattern Jury Instruction is slightly more helpful. See
Binder, supra, at 447. The proposed murder instruction defines malice as hatred or ill-will
through a reckless disregard of a risk to human life or a “heart . . . fatally bent on mischief.”
RALPH KING ANDERSON JR., S.C. REQUESTS TO CHARGE: CRIM. § 2-1 (2d ed. 2012). The
instructions also state that malice is intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse; however, they do not clarify if these requirements are in addition or separate from
one another. See id.; Binder, supra, at 447.
93. See infra Appendix I (listing forty-seven state statutes that have textually adopted
felony-murder). A total of forty-eight states apply felony-murder when adding South
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thirteen states94 have statutes that apply to a defendant’s
commission or attempt to commit95 “a felony,”96 “any felony,”97
“a forcible felony,”98 or “an inherently dangerous felony.”99
Lacking any statutory limitations from the legislators, some
judiciaries chose to limit the felony-murder doctrine only to
“inherently dangerous” felonies; however, defining “inherently
dangerous” differs from state-to-state.100 To determine if the
predicate felony is inherently dangerous, the judiciary applies
either an “on the facts”101 or “in the abstract”102 test, both of which
can yield different results using the same fact pattern.103
Carolina’s judicial application. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(1). The District of
Columbia also textually adopts felony-murder; however, it is not included in this “state”
count. D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001).
94. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2014); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2020); IOWA CODE § 707.2
(2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 1 (2020)
(stating a crime punishable with death or life imprisonment is murder in the first degree);
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1994); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1972); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-320(c)(a)(1) (applying common law felony-murder); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West
1994).
95. Variations of “commission or attempt to commit” greatly vary across states. See
infra Appendix IV.
96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502.
97. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1. Delaware adds
“engaged in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit any felony[.]” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636.
98. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1; IOWA CODE § 707.2.
99. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402. Massachusetts uses the language “a crime
punishable with death or imprisonment for life” in attempt to clarify inherently dangerous
felony. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1.
100. People v. Lopez, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Cal. 1971). In Rhode Island, the predicate
felony “escape” was found to be inherently dangerous on the facts. See State v. Miller, 161
A. 222, 225 (R.I. 1932). However, in California, escape was not inherently dangerous using
in the abstract limitation. See People v. Lopez, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Cal. 1971).
101. To apply an “on the facts” test, a court will consider the facts and circumstances
of the particular case to determine if such felony was inherently dangerous in the manner and
circumstances in which it was committed. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527. See, e.g.,
Mosley v. State, 536 S.E.2d 150, 152-53 (Ga. 2000).
102. To apply an “in the abstract” test, a court will ignore the facts of a specific case
and, instead, look at the offense as it is defined by the statute to see if the offense, by its very
nature, cannot be committed without carrying a high probability that death will result.
DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 526. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal.
1989).
103. See supra note 100. Note some jurisdictions apply both tests, finding a predicate
felony sufficient for a felony-murder charge if it is inherently dangerous under either
approach. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527.
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By contrast, the other thirty-five states’ legislators104
attempted to statutorily limit felony-murder by enumerating
particular felonies.105 When it comes to the particular felonies
listed, there is, again, inconsistency.106 Statutes range from listing
only six107 or up to twenty-two predicate felonies.108 Those may
include a range of factual behaviors like delivery of a controlled
substance109 or shooting of a firearm with intent to kill.110 Most
states do enumerate a degree of arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
and kidnapping.111
Beyond textually limiting the doctrine through an
enumerated list, a range of inconsistent statutory limitations
pervade.112 For example, some jurisdictions textually limit
liability based on who committed the killing.113 A handful of
jurisdictions’ statutes limit felony-murder application to deaths
caused by the defendant or another participant.114 Other
jurisdictions have textually limited the doctrine by eliminating a
defendant’s liability solely to when the deceased was a co-

104. Note that District of Columbia has also adopted felony-murder with an
enumerated list; however, it is not noted in this “state” count. D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2001).
105. See infra Appendix II (listing thirty-five state statutes that have enumerated
particular felonies); Appendix III (mapping states with enumerated felonies); Birdsong,
supra note 16, at 21-22, 24; see LAFAVE, supra note 18, at 610-11. Note that Michigan
statutorily adopts felony-murder in the first degree with an enumerated list; however,
judicially abolished the common law application of the doctrine. People v. Aaron, 299
N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980).
106. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 2020); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019).
107. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301
(2018).
108. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West 2009).
109. See, e.g., 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (2008).
110. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012).
111. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1991).
112. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019) (textually limiting liability
extending to co-felon); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1972) (requiring death be
proximate cause of felony); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2020) (textually limiting liability
extending co-felon or victim).
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019) (textually mitigating charge to seconddegree murder if death was committed by co-felon); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013)
(textually limiting liability to “any person legally accountable for the crime”).
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
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felon.115 Still other jurisdictions have chosen to put both of these
limitations into their statutes’ wording.116
When no statutory language expressly constrains the felonymurder rule, courts choose to either read in limitations or reject
their application.117 Courts have inconsistently interpreted the
language of a statute to reach different results when deciding
whether to extend liability to deaths caused by police officers118
or victims of the intended felony.119 More disarray exists when

115. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (McKinney 2019); Hatchett,
supra note 11, at 1060 n.97.
116. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2019). For another example, Washington’s
first-degree murder statute states: “[h]e or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of
[enumerated felonies] and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate
flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than
one of the participants . . . .” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975) (emphasis added).
117. Compare State v. Bonner, 411 S.E.2d 598, 598-99 (N.C. 1992) (declining to
extend liability to defendant when police killed co-felon), and State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20,
30 (N.J. 1997) (holding liability does not extend to defendant when victim killed co-felon),
with Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 1978) (upholding defendant’s charge when
police killed co-felon), and State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399, 404-05 (Wis. 1994) (judicially
extending liability to defendant when victim killed co-felon). See also Sheriff, Clark Cty. v.
Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 (Nev. 1973) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when victim
killed co-felon). See generally Hatchett, supra note 11, at 1063-78.
118. For example, both the California and Pennsylvania murder statute use the
language “in the perpetration . . . of a felony[.]” CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2020); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1978). Note that, California has an enumerated list of applicable
felonies. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189. Although both jurisdictions share the same textual
limitation, the California judiciary in Caldwell, expanded the doctrine to reach the defendant
for conduct of the police officer; by contrast, Pennsylvania’s judiciary in Redline refused to
apply the doctrine. Compare People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 281 (Cal. 1984) (judicially
extending liability to defendant when police killed co-felon), with Commonwealth v.
Redline, 137 A.2d 472, 482-83 (Pa. 1958) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when
police killed co-felon).
119. Compare State v. Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992) (holding liability
does not extend to defendant when victim killed bystander), with People v. Lowery, 687
N.E.2d 973, 977-78 (Ill. 1997) (extending liability to defendant when victim killed
bystander).
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courts decide to apply the doctrine when an officer inadvertently
kills a victim,120 bystander,121 or another officer.122
Rather than parse out the role the shooter or victim played,
some jurisdictions judicially interpret other statutory language in
a limiting fashion.123 Some states textually require only that the
death be “in the course of and in furtherance of the [felony] . . . or
in immediate flight[.]”124 When explicit statutory language about
flight is lacking, courts have interpreted liability to continue
during flight from the predicate felony.125 Then, courts, state-tostate, disagree about when flight ends.126 Therefore, some courts
have attempted to clarify the felony-murder rule’s scope by
narrowing the applicability only to deaths proximately caused by

120. Compare Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (1934)
(upholding defendant charge when police killed victim), with Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209
N.E.2d 308, 312-13 (Mass. 1965) (holding defendant not liable when police killed victim).
121. Compare State v. Kress, 253 A.2d 481, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969)
(holding defendant liable when police killed bystander), with Hill v. State, 295 S.E.2d 518,
521 (Ga. 1982) (denying liability to defendant when police killed bystander), overruled by
State v. Jackson, 697 S.E.2d 757, 767 (Ga. 2010).
122. Compare People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1993) (holding
defendant liable when police killed another officer), with Commonwealth ex. rel. Smith v.
Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa. 1970) (refusing to extend liability to defendant when police
killed another officer).
123. Delaware’s murder statute textually limits felony-murder to deaths caused
recklessly, while the judiciary further limits the doctrine by requiring a causal connection
between the death and predicate felony. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); see Comer
v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 338-39 (Del. 2009) (holding that a defendant is not liable for death
caused by victim).
124. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016).
125. Commonly referred to as the res gestae requirement, the felony-murder rule
applies to homicides that occur while the felony is being committed and “continues, even
after commission of the crime, while the felon flees the scene.” DRESSLER, supra note 12, at
530. See, e.g., People v. Salas, 500 P.2d 7, 15 (Cal. 1972) (applying liability to defendant
for death occurring in flight of predicate felony although limitation was not textually in
statute).
126. Compare Auman v. People, 109 P.3d 647, 656 (Colo. 2005) (holding “immediate
flight terminates when a sole participant in the subject felony is subject to complete custody,
or, alternatively, when all participants in a predicate felony involving more than one
participant are subject to complete custody”), and People v. Wilkins, 295 P.3d 903, 910
(Cal. 2013) (extending liability to deaths during “continuous transaction” of crime including
flight until reached place of temporary safety), with State v. Lucero, 64 P.3d 191, 194 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003) (holding “[n]o Arizona case has adopted the doctrine that flight ends when a
suspect has reached a place of temporary safety”).
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the predicate felony.127 Still unpleased with the doctrine’s
inconsistent and imbalanced results, multiple states, under certain
circumstances, provide defendants with an affirmative defense
that limits felony-murder to reasonably foreseeable deaths.128
Still other examples of statutory and judicial inconsistency
exist.129 One jurisdiction textually requires an additional mens rea
beyond mere intent to commit the underlying felony.130 Other
courts limit felony-murder through the “merger doctrine,”131
which requires that the predicate felony be independent from the
homicide.132 In other words, if the predicate felony is an assault,
battery, or includes assaultive behavior that is an integral part of
the killing, it merges with the homicide; thereby, preventing a
felony-murder charge.133 However, the jurisdictions that have
chosen to use the merger doctrine still lack a unified application
of that limitation.134
127. Ohio textually requires the proximate cause limitation, while Illinois judiciary
reads in the limitation. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (West 1974); see People v. Space,
103 N.E.3d 1019, 1030 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
128. The Maine statute states:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution . . . [if] the defendant . . . [d]id not
commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure or
aid the commission thereof; . . . [w]as not armed with a dangerous weapon, or
other weapon which under circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict
serious bodily injury; . . . [r]easonably believed that no other participant was
armed with such a weapon; and . . . [r]easonably believed that no other
participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious
bodily injury.
ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 202 (1991). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975).
129. Ohio statutorily requires the death be the proximate cause of committing or
attempting to commit the felony and judicially chooses to reject the merger doctrine. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02; see State v. Cherry, No. 20771, 2002 WL 1626105, at *5 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002).
130. Delaware defines murder in the first degree “[w]hile engaged in the commission
of, or attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the
person recklessly causes the death of another person.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013)
(emphasis added).
131. The merger doctrine is also referred to as the independent-felony or collateralfelony limitation. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 527-28. Compare Huntley v. State, 518
S.E.2d 890, 893 (Ga. 1999) (declining to adopt the merger rule), with State v. Comitz, 443
P.3d 1130, 1134 (N.M. 2019) (applying collateral-felony rule).
132. DRESSLER, supra note 12, at 528.
133. Id.
134. Courts differ on applying the merger doctrine to felonies that involve assaultive
conduct, such as kidnapping. See People v. Escobar, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 883, 890-91 (Cal. Ct.
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The shifting and unpredictable application of the felonymurder rule across all fifty states, not surprisingly, produces
inconsistent charging results.135 With every state seemingly
limiting and applying the doctrine differently, it begs the question
of whether an optimal reform solution exists.

III. JUDICIARY EMPOWERMENT
Since the felony-murder doctrine’s arrival in the United
States, courts have frequently stepped in to limit the rule in the
absence of statutory limitations.136 First, Part III(A) introduces
Torres v. State as an example, showing the judiciary narrowly
construing felony-murder through a new jurisdictional limitation.
Part III(B) explains how jurisdictional statutes operate in relation
to specific felonies and how that analysis changes with felonymurder offenses. Next, the Part examines how jurisdictional
statutes, if interpreted correctly, can limit certain intrastate
felony-murder offenses.137 Part III(B) concludes that legislative
efforts to cabin felony-murder have not worked; instead,
inconsistent textual legislative revisions have only produced
ambiguity while preserving nationwide unfettered prosecutorial
charging. Part III(B) then proposes that if jurisdictions continue
to retain the felony-murder doctrine, a harmonious limitation is
needed and recommends a uniform “textual nexus” judicial
interpretation will suffice to produce a proactive and consistent
reform movement.
Part III(C) takes a second look at Torres and the appropriate
interpretation of Arkansas’ extraterritorial statute. Although the
Torres majority’s jurisdictional limitation was a misguided
interpretation of Arkansas’ extraterritorial statute in an attempt to
narrow the scope of felony-murder, the spirit to limit the doctrine
was sound. Part III(C) then applies the proposed harmonious
“textual nexus” judicial interpretation to the Torres facts.
App. 1996); State v. Styers, 865 P.2d 765, 773 (Ariz. 1993). See also DRESSLER, supra note
12, at 529.
135. See generally supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
136. See generally supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
137. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Holt,
440 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ill. 1982).
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A. Arkansas’ Attempt
Trial by jury is a rarity in our current criminal justice
system—occurring in fewer than three percent (3%) of state and
federal cases.138 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, application of
felony-murder during a recent trial in Arkansas received heavy
media attention.139 Arkansas’s expansive textual adoption of the
felony murder rule140 provides the state a wide latitude to charge
a defendant and pursue the death penalty.141 Arkansas is one of
twenty-eight states that legalizes capital punishment and has
arguably been center-stage in the death penalty debate since 2017

138. Nat’l Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right
to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It (2018), [https://perma.cc/P8Q7HAVM].
139. Allie Lynch, Juror on Torres Trial Speaks About Shocking Arkansas Supreme
Court Ruling, 5NEWS (Apr. 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/XJ7H-CEZG]; Benjamin Hardy,
State Supreme Court Orders New Trial in Torres Capital Murder Case, ARK. TIMES (Apr.
18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3MHF-FVY4] [hereinafter Hardy, New Trial in Torres];
Benjamin Hardy, Update: Mauricio Torres Found Guilty of Capital Murder in Death of 6year-old Son, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), [https://perma.cc/L2LC-T8DW] [hereinafter
Hardy, Update]; Benjamin Hardy, A Child Beaten, Slain Despite Red Flags, ARK. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2015), [https://perma.cc/R4V6-PAJR] [hereinafter Hardy, Child Beaten]. A
television reporter was found in contempt of court and sentenced to three days in jail for
recording a hearing in the Torres proceeding. Arkansas TV Reporter Gets 3-day Sentence
for Taping in Court, KATV (Nov. 19, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4KNV-4J8G].
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
141. The capital murder statute textually differs by creating an enumerated list of
applicable felonies. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 (2019). Arkansas’s capital murder statute
states:
A person commits capital murder if . . . [a]cting alone or with one . . . or more
other persons . . . [t]he person commits or attempts to commit: (i) Terrorism,
as defined in § 5-54-205; (ii) Rape, § 5-14-103; (iii) Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;
(iv) Vehicular piracy, § 5-11-105; (v) Robbery, § 5-12-102; (vi) Aggravated
robbery, § 5-12-103; (vii) Residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a); (viii)
Commercial burglary, § 5-39-201(b); (ix) Aggravated residential burglary, §
5-39-204; (x) A felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
§§ 5-64-101—5-64-508, involving an actual delivery of a controlled
substance; or (xi) First degree escape, § 5-54-110; and . . . [i]n the course of
and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the
person or an accomplice causes the death of a person under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . [or] . . .
[a]cting alone or with one . . . or more other persons . . . [t]he person commits
or attempts to commit arson, § 5-38-301; and . . . [i]n the course of and in
furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or
an accomplice causes the death of any person . . . .
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101.
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when it executed four inmates in an eight-day span.142 Statewide
attention continued when 2019 headlines described Torres v.
State,143 a local boy’s brutal death caused by his father’s rape and
chronic child abuse.144 Arkansas news intently followed and
published details of what became a capital murder case revealing
the failed 2014 Department of Human Services (DHS)
investigation of the young boy’s possible abuse.145 It is not
surprising, then, that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s reversal146 of
the felony-murder conviction involving egregious facts and a
capital punishment sentencing, further enhanced the state’s
curiosity.147
To fully appreciate Torres, one must first understand
Arkansas’ unique combination of textual and judicial limitations
to felony-murder.148 The Arkansas murder statute states:
A person commits murder in the first degree if . . . [a]cting
alone or with one . . . or more other persons . . . [t]he person
commits or attempts to commit a felony; and . . . [i]n the
course of and in the furtherance of the felony or in immediate
flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes
the death of any person under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . .149

142. Death Penalty Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020), [https://perma.cc/V6ER-NSHP].
Four of the eight inmates were executed. Id.
143. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d 456, 456.
144. See Hardy, Child Beaten, supra note 139; Zuzanna Sitek, Bella Vista Boy’s Death
Caused by Rape and Chronic Child Abuse, Prosecutor Says, 5NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/F9DC-J9MD].
145. Hardy, Child Beaten, supra note 139. The case sparked several potential DHS
policy changes, including additional staff training on performing searches, changes to the
system itself and requiring local offices to keep unsubstantiated reports for a longer period
of time. Id. Further, the Torres case got additional media coverage because of the
astronomical cost associated with capital murder trials. Tracy Neal, Torres, Holly Cases
Show Cost for Defense, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Mar. 19, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/QGL3-ELVL] [hereinafter Neal, Cost for Defense]. Torres’ case total cost
including, the defense, prosecutors’ and jurors’ expenses, totaled $102,904. Id.
146. Torres was reversed and remanded for new trial in February of 2020. Torres,
2019 Ark. 101, at 15, 571 S.W.3d at 465; New Trial Date Set for Mauricio Torres in Benton
County, 4029 NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019), [https://perma.cc/R5HQ-GSH5].
147. Hardy, New Trial in Torres, supra note 139; Lynch, supra note 139; Neal, Cost
for Defense, supra note 145.
148. See generally infra pp. 22-24 and accompanying discussion.
149. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
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Textually, the statute does not spell out which felonies
qualify as predicates for felony-murder.150 Rather, Arkansas
requires that a death occur in the course of and in furtherance of
any felony.151 Moreover, the statute textually extends liability to
co-felon deaths and those that occur in immediate flight from the
felony but limits application to deaths caused by either the
defendant or an accomplice.152 Finally, Arkansas requires an
additional mens rea of manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.153
Beyond statutory limitations, the Arkansas judiciary has
followed the historical pattern of pursuing other ways to limit the
doctrine by, for example, applying its own version of the merger
doctrine.154 Rather than merge every assaultive felony, it requires
the felony and the murder to have independent objectives—
regardless of the conduct’s assaultive nature.155 Thus, for the
felony-murder rule to apply, “the defendant must have an intent
or objective to commit the underlying felony as opposed to the
primary goal of murder.”156 If the defendant unlawfully entered
a home intending to commit murder, then the defendant could not
be charged with felony-murder using burglary as the predicate
felony.157 By contrast, felony-murder applies to the defendant
who shoots at an occupied car with intent to cause property

150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102.
152. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102. Doing so eliminates liability when a police officer
or a victim causes a death.
153. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102. Having the mindset of extreme indifference to the
value of human life is typically considered a second-degree murder type killing. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-103 (2005). The defendant must consciously disregard a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of causing the general social harm, death. See DRESSLER, supra note 12,
at 519. Substantive is a gross deviation from the way a reasonable person would approach
seen through extremely reckless behavior towards human life. Id. Determining an
unjustifiable risk, involves balancing the risk of the harm, here death, and the probability of
the harm with the defendant’s reason for acting. Id. If the risk of harm and probability
outweigh the defendant’s reason, the risk is unjustifiable. Id.
154. See Noble v. State, 2017 Ark. 142, at 4-6, 516 S.W.3d 727, 730-31.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 5, 516 S.W.3d at 731; see also Parker v. State, 292 Ark. 421, 427, 731
S.W.2d 756, 759 (1987); Craig v. State, 70 Ark. App. 71, 80-81, 14 S.W.3d 893, 899 (2000).
157. See Parker, 292 Ark. at 427, 731 S.W.2d at 759.
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damage and in the course and furtherance of that felony, causes
the death of another.158
Arkansas courts tend to further undermine the legislature
through the interpretation of the doctrine as applied to co-felon
actions.159 Through an Arkansas Model Jury Instruction, the
courts instruct the jury that when two or more persons are
criminally responsible for an offense, each person is liable only
for the degree of the offense consistent with that defendant’s own
culpable mental state.160 The instruction allows accomplice
felons having negligent mindsets to mitigate a first-degree murder
charge requiring extreme indifference to the value of human life
to a lesser included offense.161
Arkansas courts have introduced one other felony-murder
limitation that does little to actually limit the doctrine.162 That
arose when it interpreted “immediate flight” by construing the
plain language of the word “immediate.”163 However, it offered
no other guidance for the jury to consider when determining what
constitutes “reasonabl[e] temporal event[s].”164 By contrast,
other courts have held that flight ends once the defendant reaches
“a place of temporary safety”165 or is in “complete custody.”166
The Arkansas judiciary addressed the felony-murder
doctrine again in 2019.167 In Torres, Mauricio Torres, a resident
of Bella Vista, Arkansas, took his family on a camping trip to
nearby Missouri.168 He and his wife, Cathy Torres, awoke one
158. See Noble, 2017 Ark. 142, at 5-6, 516 S.W.3d at 731 (finding the independent
objective to commit terroristic acts rather than murder).
159. See Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 513 n.687.
160. The accomplice jury instruction states: “[w]hen two or more persons are
criminally responsible for an offense, each person is liable only for the degree of the offense
that is consistent with the person’s own [culpable mental state] [or] [accountability for an
aggravating fact or circumstance].” 1 ARK. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIM. AMCI 2d
405 (2020) (brackets in original).
161. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (2017). Felony manslaughter is a lesser
included offense of first-degree felony-murder. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(4) (2007).
162. Kauffeld v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 440, at 7-8, 528 S.W.3d 302, 308-09.
163. Id. at 7-8, 528 S.W.3d at 308-09. The court defined “immediate” according to the
Black’s Law Dictionary definition: “a reasonable time in view of particular facts and
circumstances of the case under consideration.” Id. at 8, 528 S.W.3d at 308.
164. Id. at 8, 528 S.W.3d at 308-09.
165. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
167. See Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14, 571 S.W.3d 456, 465.
168. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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morning to discover their six-year-old son, Isaiah, had eaten a
piece of cake for breakfast.169 As punishment, Torres inserted a
stick into his son’s rectum and forced him to do squats.170
Displeased with Isaiah’s performance, Cathy pushed Isaiah down,
driving the stick deeper and piercing the child’s rectum.171 By the
time the family returned home to Bella Vista that night, Isaiah
was unresponsive.172 Nearing midnight, Torres called for medical
care; however, Isaiah soon died after transport to a Benton County
hospital.173
At trial, the state spent three days building its case with
overwhelming evidence against Torres.174 Isaiah’s nine-year-old
sister, who witnessed years of abuse leading up to the camping
trip, and the forensic pathologist who examined Isaiah’s body,
were both called to testify.175 The defense rested without calling

169. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466; see also Benjamin Hardy, As Torres Trial Nears
End, Jury Hears Graphic Details of Alleged Child Abuse, Autopsy, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 10,
2016), [https://perma.cc/NK2J-FWTF] [hereinafter Hardy, Graphic Details].
170. See Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 18, 571 S.W.3d at 466-67.
174. Hardy, Update, supra note 139.
175. Isaiah’s sister testified to witnessing repeated beatings and abuse to her brother,
including, “a lot” of hitting with a stick or cable. Hardy, Graphic Details, supra note 169.
She also testified that Isaiah would have marks, be in pain, and scream or cry during the
abuse. Id. She told the court Isaiah was forced to sleep in a cage and that the was not allowed
to eat the same food as his sisters. Id. The sister testified witnessing her father once pour
bleach over Isaiah’s back, giving him chemical burns, and her father forcing Isaiah to eat his
father’s feces. Id.; Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 19, 571 S.W.3d at 467 (Womack, J., dissenting).
The chemical exposure was later confirmed and discovered from a 2014 examination at
Children’s Hospital in Little Rock, alleged as an accident. Hardy, Graphic Details, supra
note 169. The medical examiner’s testimony corroborated the sister’s testimony of chronic
abuse by presenting graphic autopsy photos of extensive bruising in different stages of
recovery, scars, puncture wounds, and lacerations covering his torso, head, back, face,
mouth, legs, abdomen, and internal organs. Id.; Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18, 571 S.W.3d at
467. The doctor affirmed that Isaiah died from the ultimate fatal issue of acute fecal purulent
peritonitis, a bacterial infection in the abdomen cavity due to traumatic disruption of his
rectum from a foreign object, but Isaiah also was subjected to a prolonged period of abuse.
Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 18-19, 571 S.W.3d at 467; Hardy, Graphic Details, supra note
169. The autopsy revealed thick scar tissue lining Isaiah’s skull cap from repeated,
significant, and traumatic head injuries and multiple acute blunt force injuries to his head,
back, and abdomen. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101 at 19, 571 S.W.3d at 467. His teeth had been
forcibly removed and he had defensive wounds on his hands and arms. Id. at 19, 571 S.W.3d
at 467. Moreover, upon investigation, Isaiah’s blood was found splattered throughout the
Torres home and camper. Id.
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any witnesses.176
After a short deliberation,177 the jury
unanimously convicted Torres of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.178
But the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed Torres’
conviction and sentence.179 In a 4-3 decision, the Court held that
Arkansas did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged rape;
the trial court therefore lacked authority to permit a conviction on
a felony-murder charge predicated on rape.180 The court reasoned
there were two opportunities for Arkansas’ extraterritorial
jurisdiction statute to apply: first, “the conduct—the alleged
rape—occur[ed] within Arkansas,” or second, “[the] result that is
an element of the offense—the alleged rape—occur[ed] within
Arkansas.”181 The court found that Arkansas’ extraterritorial
jurisdiction did not to reach the alleged rape because the conduct
occurred entirely in Missouri, and the result—death—is not an
element of rape.182 Further, the court reasoned, if “the elements
of rape could not have been met in this state . . . rape cannot serve
as an element of capital [felony] murder.”183 The court held that
a rape-felony-murder charge was legally insufficient, and because
of the prosecution’s use of a general verdict form,184 the jury
possibly convicted Torres on an inadequate theory.185
The dissent accused the majority of “misunderstanding . . .
[Arkansas’] extraterritorial jurisdiction statute[.]”186
After
176. Hardy, Update, supra note 139.
177. Id.
178. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d at 458 (majority). Torres was also found
guilty of first-degree battery. Id.
179. Id. at 15, 571 S.W.3d at 465; Hardy, New Trial in Torres, supra note 139. A juror
in the case told a news station that the Torres trial was “two weeks she will remember for the
rest of her life.” and she could not believe the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision to overturn
his conviction. Lynch, supra note 139.
180. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14-15, 571 S.W.3d at 464-65.
181. Id. at 11, 571 S.W.3d at 463; ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104 (1975).
182. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 11, 571 S.W.3d at 463.
183. Id. at 13-14, 571 S.W.3d at 464.
184. A general verdict form directs the jury to find the ultimate issue without list
specific theories, findings, or disputed issues. See General Verdict, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
[https://perma.cc/K43Z-N8YY] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
185. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14-15, 571 S.W.3d at 465. Under these circumstances,
where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, the court requires the
verdict to be set aside because it is impossible to determine which ground the jury selected.
Id.
186. Id. at 17, 571 S.W.3d at 466 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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detailing the horrific facts the majority omitted, the dissent
explained felony-murder, rather than rape, was the “offense” that
should have been analyzed.187 The dissent reasoned, because
Torres was charged with felony murder predicated on rape, the
underlying felony—rape—is only needed to replace the required
mens rea for murder.188 Therefore, for jurisdictional purposes,
the state did not need jurisdiction over the predicate felony;
rather, only the felony-murder that was charged.189 Based on this
understanding, Arkansas would have jurisdiction to charge for
Isaiah’s death because “the elements of capital felony murder
include (1) the attempt or commission of an underlying felony,
and (2) the resulting death of a person.”190 The dissent concluded
that the “plain language of [Arkansas’] extraterritorial jurisdiction
statute ma[d]e[] clear that Arkansas ha[d] jurisdiction to convict
Torres of felony murder for the Arkansas death of his son, Isaiah,
predicated on the Missouri rape.”191
Mauricio Torres is currently held without bond in the
Bentonville county jail awaiting his second jury trial rescheduled
for February 18, 2020.192 The prosecution has stated that during
retrial, it still plans on pursuing the death penalty for the
remaining child-abuse murder theory.193

B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 101
States’ extraterritorial jurisdiction statutes govern their
ability to prosecute a criminal defendant whose crime was not
wholly intrastate, and while specific statutory language may
slightly vary, states generally take the same approach.194 Statutes
typically permit an exercise of jurisdiction by any state in which
187. Id. at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
190. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 21, 571 S.W.3d at 468 (Womack, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 23, 571 S.W.3d at 469.
192. Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of
Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/BFZ9-BAKJ]
[hereinafter Neal, Retrial].
193. Lynch, supra note 139.
194. See generally Wendell Berge, Criminal Jurisdiction and the Territorial Principle,
30 MICH. L. REV. 238, 253-59 (1932) (discussing further the specific ways statutes expand
jurisdiction).
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either the conduct or the result of a crime occurred.195 Then to
convict, the prosecution must prove both the conduct and result
aspects of a crime. 196 The actus reus and mens rea make up the
criminal conduct portion of an offense.197 The actus reus, the
external part of an offense, includes (1) a voluntary act, and (2) a
social harm.198 The mens rea is the mental culpability required
for criminal liability.199 For conduct-based crimes, the analysis
stops there because the social harm society wishes to deter is the
conduct itself.200 However, when the harmful result is the activity
society wants to prevent, an additional result component is
required.201 The criminal result portion for result-based crimes
consists of the actual and proximate causation analysis,
necessarily linking the defendant’s voluntary act to the
“result[ing]” social harm.202
Examples are often helpful. For instance, possession of a
controlled substance is solely a conduct crime because having
illegal drugs is the criminal conduct society wishes to prevent.203
Larceny is another conduct-based offense.204
Once the
prosecution has proved the taking and carrying away of personal
property with the intent to permanently deprive, the resulting
deprival is irrelevant because the criminal conduct of “taking . . .
personal property of another with the intent to permanently
deprive the possessor” is what society wishes to prohibit.205
On the other hand, criminal homicide is arguably the most
straight forward result-based crime because the social harm—the
killing of a human being by another human being—is the harmful
result society prohibits.206 “Criminal homicide” is further divided
195. See Larry Kramer, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
1431, 1437-38 (1983). See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-108 (1978); MINN. STAT. §
609.025 (1986).
196. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 193-94 (4th ed. 2006).
197. Id. at 91.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 125.
200. See id. at 193.
201. See DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 193.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 193-94.
204. See id. at 592.
205. Id.
206. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 539.
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by statute into “murder” and other lesser included forms like
“manslaughter” depending on the requisite mens rea of the
defendant.207 The specific statute’s textual mens rea requirement
greatly regulates what homicide conviction is appropriate for the
defendant’s actions and mindset.208 Further, to ensure conviction,
the prosecution must prove the causation link that the defendant’s
voluntary act caused the resulting killing.209 Rape is another
result-based crime; the harmful result that society wishes to
protect against is forcible sexual intercourse.210 To convict for
rape, the prosecution would have to prove the defendant engaged
in sexual intercourse by force without consent of the victim.211
However, unlike the specific mens rea outlined in differing
homicide statutes, the defendant is guilty of rape if he possessed
any morally blameworthy state of mind.212 Although the
causation analysis in a rape is rarely litigated, the defendant’s
voluntary act—intercourse—must result in the forcible, nonconsensual intercourse outlined in the statute.213
The analysis changes when one of these conduct or result-based
crimes serves as the predicate felony in a felony-murder
charge.214 Prosecution of felony-murder requires that a death
result from the commission of a felony.215 The intent to commit
the predicate felony constitutes the specific mens rea otherwise
required for murder.216 Thus, the felony-murder rule applies if
the predicate felony’s conduct, including its actus reus and mens
rea, results in a death.217 For example, when rape is the predicate
felony in a felony-murder charge, the intent-to-rape mens rea
replaces the typical murder intent-to-kill mens rea requirement.218
207. Id. at 543.
208. See id. at 547-55.
209. Id. at 193-94.
210. Id. at 625-28.
211. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 626-28. Statute language and judiciary
interpretation of rape statutes varies greatly from state to state. Id.
212. Id. at 637-38. Defendant’s mental culpability may be excused for genuine and
reasonable mistakes to consent or force in limited circumstances. Id.
213. Id. at 625.
214. Id. at 557.
215. Id.
216. DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 557.
217. See id.
218. See.id. at 557.
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Therefore, the rape accounts for the conduct portion of a felonymurder charge.219 Another change with felony-murder is the
causation analysis, which critically no longer focuses on the
predicate felony.220 Rather, in a felony-murder prosecution, the
harmful result society wishes to protect against is death.221 Per
the above explanation, the following chart demonstrates the
important changes in the analysis.
Rape
Voluntary Act
Conduct Social Harm
Mens Rea
Result

Actual Cause
Proximate Cause

Force &
nonconsent
Forceable
sexual
intercourse

Rape Felony-Murder
Voluntary Act
Social Harm
Conduct
Mens Rea
Result

Actual Cause
Proximate Cause

M/R
for
Rape
Death

There is another layer added when the felony-murder’s
predicate felony occurs in one state, but the resulting death occurs
in another.222 Generally, a state’s extraterritorial jurisdiction
statute provides that state has the ability to prosecute a rape
felony-murder if either the conduct—rape—or the result—
death—happened within its borders.223 Therefore, the state in
which the death occurred would have jurisdiction over the
defendant for a felony-murder charge, regardless of the
extraterritorial rape.
Using jurisdictional restrictions is a plausible way to regulate
felony-murder charges. Courts in New York and Illinois have
attempted to confer jurisdiction in a way that limits the felonymurder charging applicability.224 New York upheld the state’s
jurisdiction over a prosecution for felony-murder of an in-state
death resulting from a felony committed in Connecticut.225 In
People v. Stokes, after witnessing an armed robbery in
Connecticut, detectives pursued the getaway car of the two
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See DRESSLER, supra note 196, at 559-60, 567.
222. See generally Kramer, supra note 195, at 1431-44.
223. See id. at 1439-41.
224. People v. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d 1260, 1264 (N.Y. 1996); People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d
102, 104-05 (Ill. 1982).
225. Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1264.
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fleeing individuals.226 A highspeed chase ensued, which crossed
New York state lines.227 Attempting to evade capture, the
getaway car eventually crossed an intersection and rammed into
a glass bus shelter, ultimately killing a woman inside.228 The New
York Court of Appeals held that New York had jurisdiction to
prosecute the defendant for felony-murder because the death of a
nonparticipant in New York, in the course and furtherance of a
designated felony or immediate flight therefrom, constitutes an
element of the crime of felony-murder.229
In People v. Holt, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it did
not have jurisdiction over a death that occurred in Wisconsin
although the predicate felony—kidnapping—originated in
Illinois.230 The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that conviction
for the predicate felony is not an element of felony-murder with
independent significance; rather, the predicate felony is only a
precondition to the ultimate charge of felony-murder because the
felon could not do anything “in the course of and in furtherance
of” without a felony.231 The court held that the murder was not
in furtherance of the kidnapping and therefore not “conduct which
is an element of the offense.”232
Although conferring jurisdiction between states does limit a
small portion of interstate felony-murder prosecutions, thereby
adding yet another judicial limitation into the mix, inconsistent
prosecutorial charging discretion persists. Admittedly, Stokes
and Holt addressed wholly interstate felony murders, but those
judiciaries’ focus on whether the death occurred “in the course of
and in furtherance of” the particular felony provides a blueprint
for judicially limiting all felony-murder prosecutions.233
Focusing on this language can narrow the application of felonymurder while encouraging prosecutors to replace felony-murder
charges with a more narrowly-tailored offense.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1261.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1264.
People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d 102, 104-05 (Ill. 1982).
Id.
Id.
Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 106-07; Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1262.
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As noted in Part II, state statutes currently use four
predominate textual phrases related to the nexus between the
felony and the murder.234 Requiring that the death in some way
furthers the underlying felony creates a nexus that the judiciary
can proactively enforce despite the textual language with which
it is presented.235 Although only eleven states have the exact
textual language “in the course of and in furtherance of” in their
statutes,236 the judiciary should interpret that language to require
a “felony-death nexus.”237 To be sure, many jurisdictions have
judicially already adopted that or a similar limitation,238 but
continued judicial adoption and strict interpretation is needed to
advance uniformity.

C. Textbook Theory into Arkansas Application
The Torres prosecution caused an unsettling felony-murder
outcome. This time, however, the imbalance arose from another
attempt to judicially limit felony-murder’s use in favor of a new
court-imposed jurisdictional limitation.239 The Torres dissent
234. See infra Appendix IV. This map identifies which state statutes use particular
nexus language. Originally, I believed a pattern might emerge through the circuits; however,
the only pattern seems to possibly be geographical.
235. Although Illinois statute did not textually require the limitation, the judiciary read
in the limitation by requiring the death be a part of “one continuous plan, design and
intent[.]” Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 106-07.
236. See infra Appendix IV. This map identifies which state statutes use particular
nexus language. Originally, I believed a pattern might emerge through the circuits; however,
the only pattern seems to possibly be geographical.
237. The Illinois and New York respective statutes varied greatly—one enumerating
specific felonies and textually requiring “in the course of and in furtherance of” limitation
and the other having neither textual limitation present—yet both applied the in the course of
and in furtherance of limitation. Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 105-07; Stokes, 671 N.E.2d at 1262.
238. See, e.g., Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 334, 339-40 (Del. 2009); Lee v. United States,
699 A.2d 373, 385-86 (D.C. 1997); Lester v. State, 737 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999); State v. Hokenson, 527 P.2d 487, 492 (Idaho 1974); State v. Mauldin, 529 P.2d
124, 127 (Kan. 1974); Mumford v. State 313 A.2d 563, 566 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Mass. 1990); State ex rel. Murphy v.
McKinnon, 556 P.2d 906, 910 (Mont. 1976); Romero v. State, 164 N.W. 554, 555 (Neb.
1917); Nay v. State, 167 P.3d 430, 434-35 (Nev. 2007); Gore v. Leeke, 199 S.E.2d 755, 759
(S.C. 1973); State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 294-95 (Tenn. 2000); Haskell v.
Commonwealth, 243 S.E.2d 477, 483 (Va. 1978); State ex rel. Painter v. Zakaib, 411 S.E.2d
25, 26 (W. Va. 1991). See also Binder, Making the Best, supra note 11, at 518 & n.727.
239. Torres v. State, 2019 Ark. 101, at 1, 571 S.W.3d at 458. Torres’ second jury trial
was originally scheduled to begin January 21, 2020. Id.
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rightfully concluded that the majority misinterpreted the
jurisdictional analysis of felony-murder.
The analysis of Arkansas’ specific extraterritorial
jurisdiction statute should look familiar. In Arkansas, in order for
a court to have jurisdiction over an offense, “[e]ither the conduct
or a result that is an element of the offense [must] occur[] within
th[e] state.”240 Mauricio Torres was charged with was capital
felony-murder;241 “the elements of capital felony murder include
(1) the attempt or commission of an underlying felony, and (2)
the resulting death of a person.”242 Likewise, the statute notes in
subsection (b), when the offense is homicide, as it is here for
felony-murder, either the death of the victim or the physical
contact causing death constitutes a “result” for purposes of
jurisdiction.243 Therefore, Isaiah’s in-state death is a “result” for
jurisdictional purposes.244 The Torres majority declined to adopt
this analysis despite the dissent’s repeated scrutiny of the flaws in
the majority’s reasoning.245 For support, the dissent cited
Arkansas precedent,246 the controlling state statute,247 and other
persuasive authority to show Arkansas’ clear jurisdiction to
charge Mauricio Torres with felony-murder.248
Consider this Article’s proposed textual interpretation of the
nexus phrasing “in the course of and in furtherance of” as applied
to the Torres facts. It still produces the same outcome reached by
the Torres majority, but does so without misapplying the
territorial jurisdiction limitation. Arkansas is primed to judicially
adopt this Article’s proposal; after all, the felony-murder statute
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(a)(1) (1975).
241. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 20-21, 571 S.W.3d 456, 468 (Womack, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 21, 571 S.W.3d at 468.
243. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b).
244. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b); Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 10-11, 571 S.W.3d at
462-63 (majority).
245. Torres, 2019 Ark.101, at 20-23, 571 S.W.3d at 467-69 (Womack, J., dissenting).
246. Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 748, 569 S.W.2d 74, 78 (1978). In Gardner, the
defendant argued there was no evidence that the alleged rape took place in Arkansas;
therefore, it would not have jurisdiction. Id. The court held that “if the requisite elements
of the crime are committed in different jurisdictions, any state in which an essential part of
the crime is committed may take jurisdiction.” Id. (citing State v. Scofield, 7 Ariz. App. 307,
438 P.2d 776 (1968)).
247. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104(b); Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 10-11, 571 S.W.3d at
462-63 (majority).
248. Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 22-23, 571 S.W.3d at 468-69 (Womack, J., dissenting).
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already includes the textual “in the course of and in furtherance
of” language.249 In Torres, the felony—rape—was complete
before the later death.250 The rape started and concluded in
Missouri, hours before Isaiah’s death in Arkansas.251 Therefore,
the death was not in the course of, and nor did it further, the
rape.252 This strict reading allows a court to limit the felonymurder doctrine as applied to both intra- and interstate felonymurders, thereby providing an interpretive model for other courts
seeking to uniformly narrow the doctrine.

CONCLUSION
Reform of the felony-murder doctrine began almost
contemporaneously with its creation. But legislative textual
amendments have not fixed the ongoing felony-murder charging
and application inconsistencies. With only two jurisdictions
having completely abolished the doctrine, a “next-best” solution
for uniform reform is for the judiciary to strictly interpret the
statutory phrase “in the course of and in furtherance of” to create
a nexus between the underlying felony and the death it produced.
If legislators are determined to maintain felony-murder as a part
of this nation’s law, the courts should feel empowered by the
Arkansas judiciary’s proactive spirit to limit the doctrine’s
applicability and reach.

249. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017).
250. See Torres, 2019 Ark. 101, at 14, 571 S.W.3d at 465 (Womack, J., dissenting).
251. See id.
252. This Article does not purport justifying Mauricio Torres’ actions. Not only does
the felony-murder doctrine cause ambiguity, too often the doctrine is used as a redundant
homicide source when the death reasonably could have been charged under a different
homicide method. This Article rather views the judiciary’s effort to limit the felony-murder
doctrine, despite the heinous facts, as the court’s expression of disdain toward the felonymurder’s expansive application.
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Appendix I
Forty-seven state statutes that have textually adopted
felony-murder:
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100
(2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-10-102 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2020);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a54c (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (2013); FLA. STAT. §
782.04 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (2014); IDAHO CODE §
18-4003 (2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2020); IND. CODE §
35-42-1-1 (2018); IOWA CODE § 707.2 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5402 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2015); ME. STAT. tit.
17-a, § 202 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (West
2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265 § 1 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.316 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2014); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.021 (2017);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303
(2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:1-a (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2017); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16.01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02
(West 1998); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.115 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2502 (1978); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-1 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202 (2009); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.02 (West 1994); 2009 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (West
2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-32 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A-32-030 (1975); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-1 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2019); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-101 (2013).
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Appendix II
Thirty-five states’ statutes enumerating particular
felonies:
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2016); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100
(2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (2009); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2019);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c (2015); FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2019);
IDAHO CODE § 18-4003 (2002); IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2018);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 17-a, § 202 (1991);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201 (West 2019); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.316 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 609.185 (2014); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.030 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-a (2018); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27
(McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2017); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-16.01 (1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7 (2012);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2019); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1
(2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-4 (2005); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-202 (2018); 2009 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203
(West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (2018); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-32 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1975);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (2019); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-101 (2013).
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